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The Chinese [Climate] Box:
A Scalar Approach to Evaluating Ethical Obligations in Climate Strategies for China
Erich W. Schienke, Ph.D.1
Abstract
Assuming that all nations have the ethical obligation to reduce emissions to their global fair
share, this paper investigates how distributive and procedural justice obligations, under the
broader rubric of Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change program, play out across various
political and ecological scales in China. As China is such a large and necessary player in any
global strategies for addressing climate change, it is imperative that the nation receive closer
ethical investigation across scales and sectors, and that other nations and multi-national
corporations do their fair share in helping China's various regions and sectors reach its
obligations in a post-Kyoto regime. To address the challenges to distributive and procedural
justice that emerge at global, regional, national, intra-regional, provincial, urban, and small
town & village levels, this paper proposes a multi-scalar ethical framework for evaluating
China's climate strategies as the nation formalizes its obligations to the principle of "Common
but Differentiated Responsibility," (CDR) and to a framework of Contraction and
Convergence (C&C). Part of the difficulty in addressing China's mitigation obligations is in
the ongoing articulation of the problem as primarily an obligation of national level
governance, a structural result of UNFCCC requirements. However, due to China's
complexity in both size and population, both CDR and C&C require a more nuanced and
complex articulation of ethical and practical problems across political and ecological scales.
As such, implementing China's National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP) will require
mitigation management targeting not just political, but ecosystem scales as well. In addition,
the Central Government will need to allow or provide for a "lateral" political agency for
ecosystem management efforts, so that institutions at similar scales can plan and co-ordinate
more readily.
1. Introduction
Assuming that all nations have the ethical obligation to reduce emissions to their global fair
share, this paper investigates how obligations to ethics and justice, under the broader
approach developed through the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change Program, play out
across various political and ecological scales in China. As China is such a large and necessary
player in any global strategies for addressing climate change, it is imperative that the nation
receive closer ethical investigation across scales and sectors, and that other nations and multinational corporations do their fair share in helping China’s various regions and sectors reach
its obligations in a post-Kyoto regime.
This paper will perform an analysis across eight ethical issues, first developed in the
whitepaper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change (Brown, et al 2006), which can
inform us of China's national obligations to meeting its fair share of global emissions. The
eight ethical concerns map onto the following issues: responsibility for damages; atmospheric
targets; allocation of global emissions among nations; use of scientific uncertainty in policy
making; cost to national economics; independent responsibility to act; potential for new
technologies; and procedural fairness. This normative analysis will provide an ethical
baseline for national obligations; however, in producing a normative analysis considering
national obligations, it becomes readily apparent that what may be coherent at the national
1
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level (of governance) becomes difficult to interpret into clear ethical directives at other scales
of governance and/or ecological system. Thus, ethical issues and policy obligations require a
more nuanced analysis which is introduced here as the “climate box”. (See Table 1.)
To address the challenges to distributive and procedural justice that emerge at global,
regional, national, intra-regional, provincial, urban, firms, and small town & village
enterprise levels (TVE), this paper proposes a multi-scalar ethical framework for evaluating
China’s climate strategies as the nation formalizes its obligations to the principle of
“Common but Differentiated Responsibility,” (CDR) and to a framework of Contraction and
Convergence (C&C). Part of the difficulty in addressing China’s mitigation obligations is in
the ongoing articulation of the problem as primarily an obligation of national level
governance, a structural result of UNFCCC and other international regime requirements.
However, due to China’s complexity in both size and population, both CDR and C&C require
a more nuanced and complex articulation of ethical and practical problems across political
and ecological scales than has been thus far fully articulated. As such, implementing China’s
National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP) will require mitigation management
targeting not just political, but ecosystem scales as well. In addition, the Central Government
will need to allow or provide for a “lateral” political agency for ecosystem management
efforts, so that institutions at similar scales of governance (such as mayoral and provincial
governments) can plan and co-ordinate mitigation efforts more readily and effectively.
2. Analysis of China's Ethical Obligations to Address Climate Change according to
Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change Program (EDCC)
Issue One: Responsibility for Damages. Who is ethically responsible for the consequences
of climate change, that is, who is liable for the burdens of: a. preparing for and then
responding to climate change (i.e. adaptation) or b. paying for unavoided damages?2
Arguably, China has contributed far less to historical emissions than most OECD
countries with higher Human Development Index (HDI) profiles, particularly in relation to
the US (HID of .951).3 Therefore, China's obligation to addressing such costs is rather low in
relation to past emissions output and state of development in relation to the US. Further,
various regions across China are subject to experiencing higher frequency and severity of
climate impacts. Sichuan and regions east moving towards the Gobi desert will most likely
experience more frequent and more severe droughts in addition to more severe flooding
events in the region. Mountainous regions in Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Xinjiang are
already subject to increased flooding (even under the threat, in some regions, of glacial lake
outburst floods) and the eventual decrease of snow and ice pack during winter months. With
decrease in glacial run-off, both fresh water and hydropower in the regions along the
Mekong, Yangtze, and Yellow Rivers (as well as the Ganges to the west) will experience a
long-term decline in water resources. Continued damming along these rivers will also
exacerbate this process. The coastal regions, where China's populations are most dense, are
also subject to increased risk due to rising sea levels, and in some regions, will be vulnerable
to a projected increase in frequency and intensity of storm activity. These risks, however, also
extend to other countries in the region. Moving forward, however, these risks to China’s
interior and coastline alone justify the need to take immediate and appropriate mitigation
2
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This paper will mainly compare China to the US in terms of obligations towards reduction. While China’s
population is significantly larger than the US, their emissions outputs are both each approximately 20% of all
global emissions. (Together, the US and China comprise over 40% of global emissions. Their collaboration is
both essential and an ethical imperative.)
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efforts. China will incur a debt towards future generations of its own vulnerable populations
if it does not bring emissions down to its global fair and ethical share, regardless of past
emissions. Further, China is quickly closing the historical emissions gap.
As the world's largest emitter nation, by most accounts, China is responsible for
preparing for and responding to climate change within its capacity to do so. With an HDI of
.77, China is not amongst the least developed countries in the world, and is developing a
significant affluent population in urban regions such as Beijing and Shanghai. As such, the
nation will inevitably be required to tap its growing affluence, particularly in the coastal
regions, to adequately adapt to coming climate impacts. Further, in addressing the
distributions of harms and benefits resulting from climate change, the country (central,
provincial, and urban governments) will need to continue developing means to address the
disparities between the wealthier regions along the coast and the poorer interior, particularly
as the increase of drought and flood impact the interior. In addition, as China becomes a more
affluent nation in the region, it also becomes more attractive for migration for populations in
other countries bordering it. North Korea, regardless of the dire political-economic situation
the country faces, could provide a massive influx of refugees if severe famine were to occur
due to climate change or severe flooding.
The question of China’s responsibility for climate impacts based on past emissions is
up for debate, but consideration of future responsibility of climate impacts indicates clear and
present ethical obligations towards immediate action.
Issue Two: Atmospheric Targets — What ethical principles should guide the choice of
specific climate change policy objectives, including but not limited to, maximum humaninduced warming and atmospheric greenhouse gas targets?
Arriving at an ethically satisfactory level of global emissions is to be determined by
the degree of warming and ensuing damages that would not cause exceptional harm or
endangerment to particularly vulnerable populations, especially those poorer populations that
will both cannot afford adaptation costs. A relatively "safe" level of warming would be at 2°C
or under, projected at roughly 450ppm. The level of global emissions is already expected to
surpass this, even if all significant emissions were immediately reduced. To meet this goal,
total output needs to be reduced to about 70-80% of current levels.4
Climate change and the obligations to adhere to a global obligation towards reduction
are supported by a theory of global ethics. Global ethics are primarily argued under the
ethical theory referred to as cosmopolitanism, i.e. a universal ethics applying to everything
within the cosmos. (Dower 2002) There are multiple critiques that call into question the
legitimacy of a global ethics, namely communitarianism and relativism.
"Advocates of global ethical responsibilities respond to relativism and communitarianism by
making several arguments including the following:
•
Although it may be true that not all people agree with global ethical principles, they
ought to as a matter of ethics accept global obligations;
•
Those that believe in relativism have no principled way of condemning atrocities of
one group on another such as the conquistador's treatment of the Aztecs.
•
Even though moral obligations may arise from social relations with others, there is no
reason why ethical principles developed at a local scale should not be extended to a global
scale;
•
Because people are often members of more than one cultural group to which they

4
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acknowledge duties, there is no reason why they should not acknowledge obligations to the
global community." (Brown 2009, Dower 2002)
In terms of reducing GHG output, China considers its primary obligation, like any
nation, to its own population and economy first, then to those nations that support its
interests. However, when we begin to consider the interconnected nature of and the actions
China takes in the areas of economy & trade, security, disease, sporting events, technology,
and others, the nation cannot make the argument (within cosmopolitan ethics) that on one
hand there is a need to participate in and even lead the global economic community, while on
the other, it does not need take a leading role in the case of global climate mitigation. That is,
China cannot argue for global participation in the case of economy and not also play a
supporting role in the case of climate change. Further, China needs to participate in global
emissions limits to prevent "leakage" of emissions, i.e. displacement of emissions from
moving manufacturing from countries with heavier regulations to those with far more lax
standards.
Issue Three: Allocating Global Emissions Among Nations — What ethical principles
should govern the allocation of responsibility among people, organizations, and governments
at all levels to prevent ethically intolerable impacts from climate change?
The main issue at stake here is the determination of an ethically appropriate and
relevant GHG output for China. As is articulated in Ott et. al. (2004), various ethical systems
converge on the conclusion that overall atmospheric levels of GHGs ought to be stabilized at
the lowest possible levels of concentrations. Determining precisely what this level ought to be
for China is, politically, a highly contentious issue. As a nation, the per capita emissions are
relatively low. From 1990 the per capita emissions grew from 2.1 tons to about 3.84 tons in
2004 (source: CDIAC 2005), still at levels about one quarter to one sixth of that in the US,
depending on lifestyles. Nevertheless, in 2004 China was the world's second highest emitter
nation, just behind the U.S., and has recently surpassed those levels. Further, as China
continues to develop infrastructure, increases the use of personal automobiles, and expands
the housing footprint in a sprawling megablock approach to urban development, the country,
particularly urban areas, will continue to expand its per capita GHG footprint in the coming
decades. As well, there is a growing disparity between per capita emissions for those living in
the city versus those living in the rural and agricultural regions.
Based on principles of an egalitarian distributive justice across the globe, some
account of per capita emissions needs to be considered when determining China's fair share
of global emissions. However, this obligation must internally extend to how emissions ought
to be determined at a per capita level within the country. That is, based on both egalitarian
and welfare (Rawlsian) approaches to distributive justice, China is ethically obligated to
ensure that per capita emissions are not unfairly distributed across its population. In other
words, China cannot make the argument that a per capita emissions approach to determining
its national fair share at a global level, which at the same time allowing per capita emissions
allocations to range from 0.6 tons/yr in rural regions (which contains over 70% of the nation's
population) only to allow citizens living in wealthier urban regions to continue growing per
capita outputs to levels that are equivalent to those in highly developed regions of the world,
at per capita levels of around 25 tons/yr. Ethically, China cannot reasonably allow its poorer
populations to displace the emissions of the wealthier populations of the country, and would
further be obligated to ensure a per capita cap for the wealthier regions as the poorer regions
continue to develop.
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Issue Four: The Use of Scientific Uncertainty in Policy Making — What is the ethical
significance of the need to make climate change decisions in the face of scientific
uncertainty?
Some countries and political communities have deliberated some aspect of the
certainty of the severity or actuality of climate change, and have argued against taking actions
based on claims of scientific uncertainty. For years in the U.S., claims about scientific
uncertainty underpinned many of the reasons for either not taking action, as the costs of
action would far outweigh any possible costs of impacts. Since the IPCC 2007 report, the
reality of climate change and the tremendous costs of coming impacts was stated to be
unequivocal. By 2009, most national governments acknowledge the reality of climate change;
yet continue to hesitate on adopting strict caps and developing comprehensive mitigation
plans moving forward to bring down global levels.
For the most part, China has tended to adopt some of the more optimistic of
projections about climate change impacts while choosing to take less seriously the higher risk
scenarios. China is all too familiar with the problems of severe flooding along its major
rivers, so ignoring such warning signs seems socially, economically, and politically unwise.
On the one hand, using claims of scientific uncertainty to argue against confronting wicked
political-economic problems, such as what to do about the nation's massive dependence upon
coal, only belay and intensify the severity of a decision that will need to be made down the
line. On the other hand, scientific uncertainty cannot be ignored when proposing mitigation
solutions, such as the risk and effectiveness of carbon capture and storage from the burning of
fossil fuels.
China needs to continue increasing its scientific capacity in studying the global and
regional carbon cycle, particularly in relation to its industrial output. Further rationalizing
process such as urban development would also go a long way towards improving efficiency
in infrastructure. Increasing the capacity of research networks, such as China FLUX (at CAS
Institute for Geography and Natural Resource Research), will allow the nation to better
monitor its overall terrestrial carbon flux. Improving and enforcing industrial monitoring
standards, particularly in the capacity of the local and regional offices of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) will significantly reduce uncertainty and margins of error in
carbon accounting.
Even with significant scientific certainty about the location, severity, and costs of
climate impacts, scientific results alone will not provide policy makers with an appropriate
framework for action. Scientific results and accounting of carbon flows will play a significant
role in improving planning and policy making and reducing overall uncertainty in the system.
However, ultimately, when and what China ought to do about climate change requires
making ethical decisions about both about its own population and about its impact on the
global commons.
Issue Five: Cost to National Economies — Is the commonly used justification of cost to a
national economy for delaying or minimizing actions to reduce the threat of climate change
ethically justified?
Many nations have resisted calls to reduce their GHG emissions based first on the
costs to national economies across various sectors, and second, because most cost-benefit
analysis used to determine or justify such actions will not conclude the reduction of GHG
emissions as a worthwhile investment now as opposed to in the future. (Brown 2002,
Nordhaus 2007) Both the U.S. and China have put forth the argument through various drafts
of the UNFCCC (Kyoto protocol) and became a primary reason argued by the US for pulling
out of the accord in 1997.
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China has argued, as a non-Annex I nation, that its number one priority is to its
continued economic development, which has been roughly 8-10% per year for roughly the
past 30 years, and is currently mandating a sustained 8% (“protect 8”) growth rate moving
forward. China's rapid and peaceful rise as one of the world's leading economic superpowers
has not come without significant costs in emissions. The U.S. has been the world's leading
historical emitter nation since 1850, but this is a gap China is also quickly narrowing. 5
Further, the very broad category of non-Annex I countries provides very little granularity in
definition or degree of development and, according to development indices such as the
Human Development Index (HDI), China is certain not amongst the least developed nations
and cannot continue to leverage the argument and its position in international accords as
though it is. (Hu 2009) Further, costs of emissions reductions will likely adversely impact the
economies of some regions while not impacting others. Shanxi, a major coal-producing
province (one-third of all of China's coal deposits), is under the national average per capita
GDP. Dislocating coal jobs in these regions will have a greater economic impact than on the
wealthier coastal and urban regions where the energy from coal is primarily used. However,
as Hu (2009) argues, it is the wealthier regions that need to make the reductions first,
allowing interior and western regions to continue developing while wealthier regions take on
the burden of beginning the process of contraction and convergence across sectors.
China can no longer reasonably argue the cost of not taking action on its economic
growth while simply arguing the benefits of not taking action. Implementing a Green GDP
would already bring the high growth rates down to five to six percent. Further including
overall pollution costs on human and ecological health, in some particularly polluted areas,
can even put the growth rate into the negative column, from zero to minus two percent.
Continuing development with a business as usual approach in China will only likely
exacerbate the medium and long-term bottom line costs on development and do little to
improve overall efficiency across various sectors. Further, the use of Cost-Benefit Analyses
(CBA) to determine whether, how much, what kind and when to begin mitigation actions are
typically employed without the full tally of costs a full inclusion of critical climate system
thresholds, such as the shutdown of the Meridional Overturning Circulation (MOC)
(McInerney and Keller 2007), the loss of the Greenland ice sheet, or the loss of snow pack in
the Himalayas.
Any nation, but particularly the leading emitter nations, cannot ethically argue costs to
national interests alone when the impacts affect populations through the world. Because, "no
person or nation has a right either to harm others as a means to achieve their economic health
or to endanger others' life, health, or security." (Brown et al 2006)
Issue Six: Independent Responsibility to Act — Is the commonly used justification for
delaying or minimizing climate change action that any government need not act until all
others agree on action ethically justified?
In a similar vein as arguments about costs to national economies, some nations
(particularly the U.S. and China) have put forth the argument that they have no responsibility
to lower their emissions until other nations do. China has strongly argued throughout its
engagement with the UNFCCC, that it certainly is not obliged to reduce its emissions before
the US, particularly because of the potential setbacks this would have on development. This
is a significantly more reasonable argument, at the face of it, than the US position that it will
not reduce emissions until China is fully on board in the Kyoto/post-Kyoto process.
5

The US leads the world in historical emissions from 1850-2002 at a total of 29.3%, while China only
contributed 7.9% of historical emissions. However, as revealed in a study forecasting China’s emissions, the
emissions growth rate from 2000-2010 is projected at an annual rate of 11.05–11.88 percent, increasing China’s
annual emissions output from 1000 MMTCE in 2002 to 2600 MMTCE in 2010. (Auffhammer 2008: 245)
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However, even if in this case the US was to begin significant reductions and China was not,
this would likely result in emissions leakage in the further displacement of manufacturing in
the US to China, such as the case of consumable goods, steel, aluminum, and other energy
intensive manufacturing. (That is, labor is not the cheaper commodity as much as lax
emissions regulations would be.)
Some nations within the East Asian region, such as Bhutan, are already experiencing
heavy impacts and are under the threat of severe flooding and loss of cultural artifacts
(Schienke and Nidup 2008), yet have contributed next to nothing to global emissions levels.
Developed nations, such as the US, have contributed most to this problem. Yet, as mentioned
earlier, China is quickly closing this historical emissions gap and cannot justly make the
argument that it has a right to continue business as usual practices.
Under the UNFCCC, developed (Annex I) nations such as the US agreed they would
reduce GHG emissions first based on issues of equity to prevent dangerous changes to the
climate system based on human activity. From this agreement, and as has been heavily
argued by China, nations acknowledged a "common but differentiated responsibility" (CDR)
to take action on emissions reduction. However, in practice, no significant responsibility or
action has been taken this far on the part of either the US or China. Further, such a standstill
has actually proven mutually beneficial to the political-economic elements that are
proponents of business as usual practices.
There is a tolerable limit to global emission where nations can emit without adversely
affecting the global climate system. As such, nations such as the US and China who refuse to
reduce their emissions have the burden of demonstrating that emissions are below the nation's
just share of global emissions. While determinations of what precisely is a just or fair share of
global emissions continues to be a contentious issue among nations, and a CDR approach
seems just and reasonable, worldwide emissions need to reduce to about 20% of 2004 levels.
For the US, this would require somewhere in the neighborhood of a 90% reduction of current
levels. China alone, according to a recent Global Carbon Project report (GCP 2008, Gregg et
al 2008), accounts for at least 18% of 2004 global emissions, and has very probably increased
this amount somewhat significantly in the buildup to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.
Much attention in this buildup has been put on China's increased energy consumption
in the form of coal, but cement is likely a significant factor as well, as one ton of cement
equals one ton of CO2 emissions. That is, if China were only to hold steady at current
emissions levels and the rest of the entire world were to cease any emissions, China would
still continue to increase global emissions at a much slower but still unsafe rate. As such,
China in particular can make no ethically justifiable argument at this point for not taking
immediate action towards reduction, let alone put forth an argument for the continued growth
of emissions levels as the country develops.
China has an immediate duty to cease activities that are both harming other
populations and its own population, regardless of the actions of any other nation. Further,
actions such as excessive emissions or pollution may be considered as wrongful under
international law, "even in the absence of a violation of a specific agreement such as the
UNFCCC." (Brown et. al. 2006) China has an ethical obligation to begin reducing emissions
immediately, regardless of the actions taken by other nations. Even more so, all developed
nations have a duty to reduce emissions immediately, regardless of China's actions.
Issue Seven: Potential New Technologies — Is the commonly used justification for delaying
or minimizing climate change action until less costly technologies are invented ethically
justified?
The question of new technologies is perhaps one of the most interesting in terms of
ethics, international obligations, and in the practicality of holding promise in the future. Some
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nations argue that reduction of emissions should be delayed until newer, more appropriate
and less costly measures are developed and become available on the market. The reasons
given for waiting tend to be premised on at least four main assumptions: 1) existing
technologies are too costly and will hurt the economy; 2) new technologies that can help to
reduce emissions now will be less costly in the future; 3) waiting for new or less costly
innovations will not cause harms; and 4) that there are no unintended consequences or high
risks that come with the new technologies. (Brown et. al. 2006) Further, it is assumed that
market pressures and demands will catalyze the development of newer technologies.
However, considering current financial markets, it is not likely wise to wait for market
incentives to drive the demand for such innovation, and will likely only come at the level of
governmental directives/initiatives for guiding innovation in energy efficiency and emissions
reductions.
There exists a wide variety of technologies that China needs to consider carefully
when adopting an innovation strategy and for purposes of mitigation and efficiency
improvements. I will quickly address two technology paths that, on the face of it, seem quite
appealing but can quickly bring a variety of ethical problems in their adoption, namely,
carbon capture and storage and biofuels. Other technologies requiring further ethical analysis
would include transportation (all sectors), other forms of “clean energy,” buildings and urban
layout plans, nuclear energy, land-use strategies, sanitation, and food.
Carbon Capture and Storage: The first technology path considered here is that of carbon
capture and storage (CCS), 6 a process that captures CO2 from coal-fired and natural gas
based power plants and stores it in underground geological formations, such as saline
aquifers, spent oil fields, and others. The primary problem is that coal provides China with
approximately 75% of its energy, yet coal releases more GHGs per unit of energy than any
other form of fossil fuel combustion. The general principle of capturing carbon from either
burnt coal or natural gas seems quite appealing at the outset, particularly because it can be
used in the retrofitting of some existing power plants. Because of its appeal and the
opportunities it presents to continue burning one of the cheapest and most abundant sources
of energy throughout the world, i.e. coal, many governments have lauded the possibility of
CCS strategies and have counted them as amongst their nations' most accessible strategies for
GHG sequestration from the energy production.
The technology of geologic carbon storage remains unproven and can pose significant
risks to human and ecosystem health. For example, the geologic sequestration of CO2 is
limited in space and time, in that it is highly unlikely that there will be enough ideal space for
storing necessary CO2 over the long-term as many saline aquifers could be saturated/filled in
a matter of a few decades if the burning of coal were to continue at current projected rates.
The issue of suitability of a site poses significant uncertainty in determining, whether under
great pressure, if a cap rock would prove sufficient and that there would be no other pathways
for CO2 to leak from. Long-term studies about the suitability of sties have not been
conducted, and the technology is primarily based on models and maps of possible locations,
not so much on long-term empirical testing.
6

Please note, CCS is a different technology than “clean coal”. There are two generations of clean coal
technology. The first generation of clean coal technology is based on a process where the coal is heated
underpressure at 2000 F, thus allowing for heavier impurities such as sulfur and mercury to be removed,
allowing for a mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide (http://www.governing.com/articles/4coal.htm) to
remain. This mixture can then be either burned as directly as a gas or liquefied into a variety of other fuels.
However, these first generation processes do not remove the primary greenhouse gas, namely CO2. While the
process is helpful in reducing SO2 and M, first generation clean coal is not a viable option for addressing the
mitigation of greenhouse gasses, and therefore should not be considered a viable solution to increasing any
nation's energy portfolio moving forward.
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The primary problem and biggest risk posed by CCS is not necessarily the long-term
suitability and plausibility of the technology, but of basing business-as-usual practices of
burning coal at ever increasing rates on the less-then-certain promise of how much and how
safely CCS can deliver in terms of CO2 mitigation. For a nation like China, which depends
on coal mainly from its own supply for 75% of its energy, CCS will likely seem very
appealing as a way forward in terms of mitigation. However, the Chinese government and
industries would be unjust if they began counting the potentials of CCS already in the plus
column of mitigation strategies.
Biofuels: The second technology path concerns the use of biofuels for use in automotives,
heating, and other forms of power generation. Biofuels are combustible fuels extracted from
feedstocks through a variety of fermentation and extraction processes. Ethanol, methanol,
biodiesel, and methane are the most common forms of biofuels readily available today, and
many are in wide use around the world. Common feedstocks include corn, soybean, palm oil,
sugarcane, pulpy wood fibers, grasses, and discarded foodstuffs.
Biofuels are not all equal in efficiency and output. A recent study conducted by Adler
et al (2007), produced a lifecycle assessment of various crops for use in biofuels production.
The findings suggested that, "compared with the lifecycle of gasoline and diesel, ethanol and
biodiesel from corn rotations reduced GHG emissions by ~40%, reed canarygrass by ~85%,
and switchgrass and hybrid poplar by ~115%." (Adler et. al. 2007) With relatively modest
reductions of GHGs of ~40%, corn again does not seem like the best option, particularly
when compared with the GHG emissions savings of reed canarygrass, switchgrass, or hybrid
poplar. (Schienke 2007)
Beyond obvious choices about energy efficiency, many biofuel feedstocks are coming
under increasing demand, a demand that is directly competing with food prices. Corn is an
excellent example in this case. In North America, corn prices are being driven up by demand
for use in ethanol production in the U.S., a demand that is directly influencing the prices of
corn used for tortillas in Mexico. Poorer populations are being required to pay more for a
basic food staple because U.S. policy is requiring the increased use of ethanol. This could
very easily be the case in China if corn or soybean begins being used as a major feedstock for
ethanol or biodiesel. In addition to competing with food prices, biofuels also present
extensive challenges to land-use policies. This may be a slightly less pressing issue in a
country such as the U.S., but presents tremendous challenges for a country like China with a
vast and dense population. In China, the land use tradeoffs alone for producing biofuel crops
make it a prohibitive option, all except for a few possibilities with cellulosic methanol.
To briefly summarize the ethical issues at stake in considering biofuels production,
principles of distributive justice require that the benefits and burdens of biomass production
be distributed fairly across stakeholders. Distributional consequences of environmental
change are likely to arise in the consideration of how planting of biofuels stock can affect
livelihood changes such as changing access to environmental and ecosystem services, the
disruption of clean water, hunting and fishing grounds, and/or natural scenery. In addition,
consideration will be given to possible impacts on human health brought on by resulting
environmental changes from farming biomass feedstocks, from the location of biomass
processing sites, and from the disposal of wastes generated by biomass processing facilities.
Whereas, principles of procedural justice require the economically and demographically fair
and representative selection of citizens in decision-making processes. For China, the most
ethical and energy efficient approaches to the use of biofuels appear to be in the use of hybrid
poplars and switchgrasses for cellulosic methanol and ethanol, particularly in regions that
require reforestation and planting of grasslands in assisting desert reclamation projects, such
as in Ningxia and in the Gobi. In addition, further development and use of biogas digesters in
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rural areas also seems efficient and just, and should receive further investment from the
government and NGOs.
Issue Eight: Procedural Fairness — What Principles of Procedural Justice Should be
Followed to Assure Fair Representation in Climate Change Decision Making
Both within the nation and in relation to China's engagement on the world stage,
adhering to the principles of procedural justice in climate policy development will require
vigilance. Procedural justice demands the participation of stakeholders, in this case those
stakeholders who will be subject to climate impacts, to have a representative voice in the
decision making process. At the international level, this would likely take multiple forms.
First, China needs to assure the global community that it is fully participating in the IPCC
and post-Kyoto climate regimes. Second, China needs to continue being a leading voice for
the robust participation of developing nations, while at the same time assuring that its size
and scale do not entirely dominate the discourse and procedure for other developing
countries, particularly within the East Asian region, and as China continues to move forward
with investments in Africa. At the national level and below, the nation will need to ensure
that the voices of those being impacted the most will be part of the decision-making process.
However, the current political arrangements does not well support this kind of input from
communities and this will not likely change without further pressure from both the outside
and from the bottom up.
Currently, local participation in China tends to mean participation by men, and men in
positions of authority. This form of participation is not thorough, nor is it representative. The
problem is that it is often assumed that those already in positions of authority, such as local
politicians and administrators, are in a better position to represent the needs of the people, as
opposed to “ordinary” citizens. Decision-making capacity at the local level would likely
improve significantly on the side of implementation, for example if the community
infrastructure of local “Ju Wei Hui” (居委会) was used to gather, observe, and report on key
issues concerning carbon and environmental compliance more generally. In this regard, at
least observational data would be gathered and compiled for further review over the long
term. The retired community would also be useful in gathering data and observing, in that
they would be able to oversee data collection and federation, producing simple environmental
reports that could be compiled over districts, counties, and provinces. Direct action in local
politics may not be the answer for China’s current political structure, but some form of
observation and reporting would be helpful and could easily be based on public participation
and local community involvement.
3. A Multi-Scalar Approach to China's Ethical Obligations to Act on Climate Change.
While directives implemented and followed through at the national level are a necessary and
crucial dimension to fulfilling climate change obligations, the scale of problems in China
presents the situation that an analysis of national directives alone does not get at the deep
complexity and conflict facing the country across multiple scales of governance. Further,
engaging China only at the level of the national government does not ensure the robust
participation of the many levels of governance below it. As briefly described below,
collaborating with China on engaging climate change can and will need to happen across
multiple scales and proper funding and support will need to follow in kind.
As Table 1 attempts to illustrate, the directives and problems for proper climate
mitigation policies are different for different levels of administrative authority, i.e.
governance. In some cases, both ethical directives and policy directives can be in conflict
with directives at other levels of governance and would require ensuring that emissions
“leakage” would not occur through tightening regulation at one level, such as the national or
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provincial level, while leaving bureaucratic gaps at the urban/local level or, especially, at the
small town and village enterprise (TVE) level. For example, it would make much sense that
energy policy at the national level be directed towards the overall reduction of coal fired
power plants with a move towards renewable energy sources, while at the urban/local level
energy the gains are lost through lack of regulation and enforcement of building codes
concerning something as simple as proper and sufficient insulation for heating and cooling of
residential structures.
Each one of the levels of governance in Table 1 represents a place for further
intervention/participation from both the Chinese government and from outside influences.
Of particular import will be the compliance with regulations at the TVE levels, where the
greatest pressure to increase GDP is countered with the strongest expectations to comply with
and adopt cleaner and more efficient solutions. Following closely behind this trend, firms and
industrial facilities are pushing hard to develop a profit in an ever more competitive global
economic setting. The first thing to be sacrificed in such situations is going to be cleaner
production methods and investments into newer facilities. Outside firms operating or
cooperating with local Chinese firms are going to need to be vigilant in demanding that less
carbon intensive production is demonstrated thoroughly and robustly, and that local Chinese
firms are not shifting production to other, less-clean facilities within the country.
Moving forward, dimensions of Chinese carbon governance will need to work
coherently together across scales if contraction and convergence towards a national cap is to
be implemented properly and cohesively, without further exacerbating problems around the
distribution of harms and benefits, particularly to poorer regions.
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Table 1. Ethical issues across scales of governance in China in moving
towards Contraction and Convergence
Scale

Ethical Obligation for China

Policy Goals

Global

Global safe levels met

Ensure participation in and support of global
climate regime and that safe levels of CO2 are
met.

Regional

Assuring fair share with regional
partners, in this case East Asia.

Responsibility to manage regional carbon flux
and industrial outputs between cooperating
nations

National

Ensure nation’s just/fair share of
global
emissions.
Addressing
independent responsibility to act and
bring emissions to fair share.

Ensure compliance at all scales below.
Determining directives for energy sector,
infrastructure, innovation, and technology
transfer.

Intra-regional

Cooperative and procedurally fair
planning across provinces and
ecosystems.
Ensuring
emissions
spillover does not occur.

Emissions balance across regions within China
on
economic
and
ecosystem
based
collaborations,
and
encouragement
of
collaboration between urban regions.

Provincial

Determination of fair share amongst
provinces and ensuring fair share even
if growth is sacrificed.

Ensuring fair
Implementing
Increasing
representation
of authority.

Urban/Regional

Ensuring cost-effective reduction
method and active planning goals
around CO2 reduction.

Planning goals for urban development, antisprawl measures, coherent transportation
networks, inter-urban collaborations.

Urban/Local

Ensuring
on
the
ground
implementation of larger scale
development and fighting unregulated
development. Improvement of local
participation in procedural process.

Strict implementation of planning codes. CO2
reduction in project choice. Support for
choosing
green
buildings.
Controlling
developers. Improving insulation in buildings.

Firms/business

Ensuring firm or business is
complying with CO2 regulation and
that emissions leakage is not
happening internally.

Increasing
CO2
reduction
compliance.
Installing cleaner more energy efficient
technologies. Demanding proof of compliance
with other partner firms. Engaging in robust
technology transfers for efficiency gains.

TVEs

Enforcing cleaner production and
adoption of cleaner technologies.
Ensuring compliance on the ground.

Implementing
clean
development
and
production strategies on the ground. Most
difficult regulatory issues here, and impetus for
business as usual is strongest.

Individual

Reducing personal GHG footprint as
much as possible.

Conscious effort of consumption habits.
Changing personal preferences and habits.
Understanding carbon footprint in every
dimension.
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share even at cost of growth.
provincial level emissions caps.
procedural
capacity
and
of participation of various levels

4. Conclusions
There are multiple conclusions that can be drawn from this brief analysis of ethical issues
facing climate change governance in China. Based on an analysis of the eight main issues
developed in the EDCC whitepaper, the most challenging issues will likely be questions
concerning: 1) China’s responsibility to other nations for damages due to climate change; 2)
the potential for new technologies, investments into cleaner technologies and technological
innovation paths; and 3) ensuring procedural fairness both on the international stage, but also
at the level local of public participation.
Many questions remain. How much should China be funding adaptation and
mitigation costs for other, lesser-developed nations? This is a question that will require
greater investigation and deliberation on the international stage. How much should China
invest in new technologies now versus investing in innovations or in waiting for technology
costs to lower in cost? In terms of procedural fairness and justice, China faces significant
challenges in improving accountability from below and ensuring participation of local
administrators as well as the general public, in some form or another.
Chinese climate governance, in moving towards a contraction and convergence
approach, is going to require a scalar methodology of oversight, resembling something
similar to the approach presented in section three. Ensuring this “climate box” is tightly
sealed will be a necessary and wicked problem for the government, otherwise emissions
leakage will most certainly occur at multiple scales. Further, achieving ethical compliance at
all scales is also going to be necessary to ensure that the distribution of harms and benefits is
not occurring in an unfair or unjust manner. Further, constructive and helpful interventions
from the outside into China ought not be focused only on interfacing with the national level
of governance. Each of these levels (scale) of governance represents an opportunity for
intervention by foreign governments, NGOs, firms, and other significant parties that have an
interest in seeing China contract and converge its emissions to the nation’s fair share of
global emissions. Again, the primary challenge for China itself will be “on the ground”
compliance and accountability of climate strategies and in developing a more robust form of
public participation in ensuring this is the case.
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